Mine-clearance Activities and ANSA
Participation: An Analysis
Effective mine action requires numerous actors to peacefully collaborate: governmental and nongovernmental,
international and local. Armed non-state actors that operate beyond central control, such as rebel opposition
groups and paramilitary organizations, and private defense companies can often provide necessary
contributions to mine action. Understanding ANSAs allows humanitarian organizations to communicate,
cooperate and avoid conflict.
by Dr. Sadi Cayci [ Avrasya Stratejik Araş tırmalar Merkezi ]

R

ecognizing the need to end the suffering and casualties caused
by anti-personnel mines, Turkey signed the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction1 in 2003. Turkey
has been exerting every effort to fulfill its obligations stemming from
the Convention. To that end, Turkey no longer produces or uses antipersonnel mines and is involved in mine clearance, stockpile destruction,
victim assistance and socioeconomic reintegration of mine victims. The
latest demonstration of the determination with which Turkey fulfills its
obligations is the Mine and Ordnance Disposal Facility that came into
operation as of 8 November 2007. 2
Convinced that mine action is both a humanitarian issue as well as
one of disarmament, Turkey supports efforts aimed at ridding the world
of the scourge of these indiscriminately used weapons through the global

Parties through NGOs. Indeed, States Parties have benefited from
assistance sought and provided through NGOs that carry out activities
in this field on some occasions. The Convention, however, does not
authorize NGOs to act ex officio. In view of the relevant provisions of
the Convention, the request and consent of the State Party concerned is
a sine qua non element of the complementary activities of said NGOs.
The Nairobi Plan of Action, which is a political document designed as
a five-year roadmap, does not amend or modify this understanding
inherent in the Convention.4
One of the ways in which States Parties have sought assistance
through NGOs is by having their armed non-state actor(s) engage in
mine action. Under international law this is, however, questionable
because a State Party does not bear a responsibility for acts that are
committed in areas where a de facto authority, such as an ANSA, may
have actual control. Several States
Parties have requested or allowed
such engagements in order to
fulfill obligations they do not
believe they can otherwise fulfill, as Mine Ban Convention
obligations extend to all areas
under States Parties’ jurisdiction
or effective control. Some States
Parties request or allow ANSA
engagement in order to remove anti-personnel landmines from the list
of weapons available to ANSAs with which they are engaged in armed
struggle. Others have sought assistance or engagement within the context of efforts aimed at peace and reconciliation. In summary, States
Parties that have acquiesced to NGO engagement of ANSAs may have
benefited from this involvement for one reason or another. 5

“…the delicate issue of engaging armed nonstate actors within the context of the Mine Ban
Convention has to be done with utmost caution,
prudence and common sense.”
implementation of the Mine Ban Convention. Cognizant of the fact that
almost 40 states that produce, stockpile or use landmines are still not
parties to the Convention—meaning that millions of mines remain at
their disposal—and situated in a geographic region where the level of
adherence to the Convention remains especially low, Turkey uses every
opportunity to address this shortcoming. At the same time, Turkey is
well aware of the fact that efforts by states alone are not adequate. 3
The Complementary Role of NGOs
The Mine Ban Convention is a legally binding international
instrument that was hammered out by states with the support of
inter-governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Conferring
certain rights and obligations to States Parties, it gives them the right
to seek and receive assistance in implementing the provisions of the
Convention. In this context, the Convention stipulates that States
Parties may seek assistance through NGOs, and that States Parties who
have the capability may also provide such assistance to other States
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The Need for a Case-By-Case Approach
The engagement of ANSAs should be considered on a case-by-case
basis, first and foremost due to definitional difficulties. While the legal
and academic debates on the definition of ANSAs continue, one crucial
aspect is clear. Many terrorist groups, which pose a threat to domestic as well as international peace and security, fit the existing widely
held definitions of ANSAs. As such, the activities of such groups may
be punishable under the domestic criminal laws of the state(s) in question, as well as international treaty law. Dealings that may amount to
or be considered as direct or indirect support for such groups may be

similarly punishable. One only needs to look
at the United States, European Union and
NATO lists of terrorist organizations, as well
as the countering-terrorism laws and lists of
proscribed organization of States Parties such
as the United Kingdom, France, Germany,
Australia and Canada. The only conceivable
way in which ANSAs with terrorist backgrounds may be engaged, is if they renounce
the use of violence, turn their weapons in and
hand their members who have perpetrated
acts of violence over to justice. Even then,
close scrutiny would be required.
Certain ANSAs may try to use humanitarian engagement as a strategy to legitimize
their political/ideological aims or even to
acquire a legal status. Subject to the specific
and applicable provisions of international
humanitarian law, which by no means may
establish a permanent and de jure status, organizations that carry out humanitarian work
have the obligation to make sure that they are
not abused. Otherwise, they may undermine
the sovereign rights and obligations of states
(such as protecting citizens from terrorist
attacks) thus increasing tensions and risking
the security environment that they aim to
enhance. Therefore, absolute compliance by
the humanitarian organizations to the neutrality and impartiality principles are of vital
importance. Moreover, in such a situation,
particularly the common public may perceive
them as a party to the conflict.
In addition to these general points that
would apply to all types of humanitarian
NGO engagement with armed non-state
actors, there are reasons specific to the Mine
Ban Convention why engagement has to
be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. First,
ANSAs that engage in terrorist activities
should not be permitted to have access to any
types of weapons, be they nuclear, biological,
chemical, radiological or conventional. It
must not be forgotten that terrorism is an
international crime and if NGOs wish to carry
out humanitarian work in the field of disarmament, they ought to be staunch supporters
of efforts to prevent not just victim-activated
anti-personnel mines but all types of weapons
from falling into the hands of terrorists.
Second, engaging ANSAs on a relatively
high profile area of disarmament such as a
total ban on AP landmines may actually be
an incentive for ANSAs to use such weapons.
The reasoning behind this is fairly straight
forward. ANSAs that previously did not use
anti-personnel landmines or had not been
using them for some time may engage in
attacks with these types of weapons to attract
international attention and possible engagement. Following engagement and exposure,

they may renounce the use of AP landmines,
which they had no intention to use in the first
place. Meanwhile, AP mines will have been
laid, indiscriminate harm will have been
caused and landmine contamination, possibly
for decades, will have occurred.
A Policy Prescription
For the reasons outlined above, the delicate issue of engaging armed non-state actors
within the context of the Mine Ban Convention
has to be done with utmost caution, prudence
and common sense. Theoretically speaking,
there may be no way to objectively measure
and implement such attributions. A common
benchmark, therefore, has to be found for
engaging ANSAs and the best possible way to
ensure this is informing the State Party concerned and obtaining its consent.

States Parties if a certain part of their territory is under the control of ANSAs. It must be
noted that all of these considerations are irrespective of where such engagements physically
take place.
Recognizing the need for prior information and consent, the Zagreb and Geneva
Progress Reports read, “…as rights and obligations enshrined in the Convention and commitments in the Nairobi Action Plan apply to
States Parties, some States Parties are of the
view that when engagement with armed nonstate actors is contemplated, States Parties
concerned should be informed and their consent would be necessary in order for such an
engagement to take place.” 7 Turkey is one of
the States Parties that shares this view.
On the other hand, when such a prior
consent of the territorial State Party is not

“After all, how many states would want to
be part of a community that undermines
their sovereign rights, especially on a
matter of national security? ”
Following on and as described in the
beginning of this paper, there are indeed States
Parties to the Convention that have requested
and benefited from having their ANSA
engaged. As there are actors in the Mine Ban
community that provide such engagement
services, and as there are third parties that
may be willing to fund these types of activities, in the event that a State Party makes the
sovereign choice of requesting or allowing the
engagement of “its” ANSA, it falls on no other
actor to question such an engagement that is
based on state sovereignty and consent.
In fact, the Nairobi Plan of Action, which
sets the operational terms of such engagements, also acknowledges the need for consent. Action 46 of the Plan stipulates, “States
Parties in a position to do so will ... continue to
support, as appropriate, mine action to assist
affected populations in areas under the control of ANSAs.”6 It is clear that States Parties
are assigned the task of mine action, insofar
as such action is deemed appropriate. In other
words, Action 46 is contingent upon the position of the State Party. Moreover, it is also
evident from this action, quoted by many to
justify unrestrained engagement with ANSAs,
that the engagement foreseen therein is limited to “assisting affected populations in areas
under the control of ANSAs.” Hence Action 46
can only be used as a basis for engagement of

required, mine clearance and other relevant
humanitarian work by third parties may, as
also described above, undermine the sovereign rights and obligations of the state. Such
NGO activities may risk serving the illegitimate objectives of the armed non-state actor
in question by increasing tension and thus
adversely affecting not just the local security
environment, but also endangering international efforts aimed at combating terrorism.
Not applying this rule of thumb also risks
sending the wrong kind of signals to states that
are outside the Convention but are seriously
contemplating accession. After all, how many
states would want to be part of a community
that undermines their sovereign rights, especially on a matter of national security? Just as
important is the question of how many States
Parties can remain in a community in which
its sovereign rights are undermined. In short,
State Party consent within the context of ANSA
engagement is vital for the globalization of and
adherence to the Mine Ban Convention.
Conclusion
It is clear that NGOs and third parties cannot achieve the common goal of creating a
mine-free world if they build their activities on
ignoring or challenging sovereign rights of the
State Party concerned. They must work in cooperation with the territorial state in question.
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NGOs and international institutions may also devise ways and means through which they
can fulfill humanitarian goals. They could find a way to advance such goals and help states create a more secure environment at the same time. They could assure states regarding the pure
humanitarian purpose of their respective institutions. Furthermore, they could prevent third
party abuse of the humanitarian cause for the purpose of intervening or undermining the sovereign rights of the state. In short, establishing an environment of mutual trust between actors is
essential to overcoming legal and political impediments. Exploring the criteria and conditions
for engaging armed non-state actors to secure their respect for international humanitarian law
and human rights standards may, indeed, yield some positive results. However, this exercise cannot be done in a vacuum, turning a blind eye to other relevant factors and developments that
shape and at times threaten international security. Otherwise, they will lead to more harm than
good in the long run.
See Endnotes, page 112

Swiss Exploring Gender in Mine Action
The initiative to understand the topic of gender in mine action
has recently generated significant discussion throughout the
global community. Specialists exploring this area are shedding
new light on the dissimilar practices, behaviors and communications of males and females in order to improve international
mine-action activities in the field and office. As part of the
Gender and Mine Action Programme, the Swiss Campaign to Ban
Landmines is currently researching and producing a genderintegrated manual that synthesizes practical recommendations
with actual case studies.

UNDP Management Training Programme
for National Mine-Action Managers
Dr. Sadi Cayci is currently International
Law Advisor at the Avrasya Stratejik
Arastırmalar
Merkezi (Centre for
,
Eurasian Strategic Studies) in
Ankara,Turkey. Cayci’s special areas of
interest are national-security law, law
of armed conflict and counterterrorism.
His activities include being a Course
Director for the International Military
Courses on the Law of Armed Conflict,
held at the International Institute of
Humanitarian Law, Sanremo, Italy.

The current training programmes for National Mine Action Managers are examined to determine the advantages
of the courses as well as areas in which the programmes can be improved.
by Charles Downs [ Downs Consulting ]
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Not only will the manual answer the question of why mine-action practitioners should be more
cognizant of gender issues, it will also answer the question of how gender-attentive procedures
may be implemented. For the latter purpose, the SCBL hopes to integrate legal theory and accessible resources to make progress easily attainable. Practicality is imperative, since the manual
is intended for a broad audience of mine-action organizations, governments, donors, civil-society
actors, gender-focused organizations and community-based organizations.
The first section of the manual will elaborate on gender as it relates to each of the five pillars
of mine action. This section will include an overview of the current state of affairs, real-world
illustrations, best practices and unsuccessful enterprises. The manual will highlight recommendations to promote realistic application of the information presented. The second section of
the manual will feature five in-depth case studies of Lebanon, Mozambique, Sudan, Sri Lanka and
Colombia. Reports for each country will include details about the current mine problem for that
country, insight about the regional gender situation, best practices and successful gender initiatives. Recommended topics for further research and piloting will also be incorporated.
The SCBL would appreciate participation in providing diverse personal perspectives for the manual.
Though the formal submission deadline of 15 February 2008 has passed, e-mail Marie Nilsson at
m.nilsson@scbl-gender for more information or to send comments. SCBL is interested in receiving a
broad range of pertinent content: project examples, initiatives, tips, ideas, measures of achievement, successful integration stories, unsuccessful initiatives, problems and relevant photos.
Additionally, the Journal of Mine Action’s upcoming Issue 12.2 will focus upon gender in mine action, and related articles are now being accepted. Please see the “Call for Papers” on the back
cover of this magazine for more information.
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Senior Managers Course participants enjoyed a metal-detector demonstration at Ft. Belvoir while studying at James Madison University.
ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF THE MAIC

F

rom 2000 to 2006, 10 Senior Managers and 40 Middle Managers
Training Courses were conducted for national staff of mineaction programmes from 42 countries. More than 800 managers
(including nearly 200 senior managers and over 600 middle managers)
completed these courses initiated by the United Nations Development
Programme. The courses were designed on the basis of a 1999 UNDPUnited Nations Mine Action Service’s Training Needs Assessment1
conducted in response to a 1997 United Nations Department of
Humanitarian Affairs study2 on the “Development of Indigenous Mine
Action Capacity,” which concluded that the absence of management
skills was a major obstacle to national ownership of mine-action programmes. At the end of 2006, the UNDP’s Bureau of Crisis Prevention
and Recovery sought to assess the impact of this training on national

mine-action programmes in order to provide a solid basis for further
decisions regarding future management training.
In December 2006, the Geneva International Centre for Humani
tarian Demining agreed to conduct a review of the courses and their
impact, with the final report to be completed by the end of January 2007.
Within this short timeframe, GICHD collected and analysed extensive information about the course providers, course participants, their
supervisors and others. It was, however, not possible to conduct country visits to assess the impact on the effectiveness of the national programme from the perspective of key external stakeholders. 3
The GICHD study team (led by the author)4 established a work plan
to collect and analyse relevant information, including interviews with
the UNDP and background documents; site visits to the two prime
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